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5C o n c l u s i o n 21Abstract
In the European Union the commission has the primary right to decide about industrial policy.
Note that this includes the possibility to allow actions of member countries as long as these are
not in conﬂict with the interest of the EU. This paper deals with the question whether such
an assignment of decision rights is appropriate by comparing it with a more decentral system
where the decision power is in the hands of the member countries which, however, may agree to
delegate this power on a case by case basis to a central authority. The analysis is performed in
an integrated Cournot duopoly with domestic and third country consumption. Here it depends
on the export ratio and the degree of uncertainty whether industrial policy is better performed
by a central authority that internalizes spillovers or by regional governments with superior
information about the costs of the regional ﬁrm. To analyze how the initial allocation of decision
rights aﬀects the actual assignment of power for a speciﬁc industry we compare two situations:
(i) An uninformed central authority decides about delegation to regional governments. (ii)
Asymmetrically informed regional governments bargain about empowering a central authority.
Interestingly delegation outperforms bargaining on average in a setting with side payments but
without information transfer. If, however, signals obtained in the bargaining stage are used to
update the own information, bargaining without side payments delivers in expectation a better
result than delegation.
Key words: Delegation; Bargaining; Industrial policy; (De-)centralization
Die europ¨ aische Kommission ist prim¨ arer Tr¨ ager der Industriepolitik in der europ¨ aischen Union.
Industriepolitische Aktivit¨ aten der Mitgliedsl¨ ander k¨ onnen jedoch zugelassen werden, solange
sie nicht den Interessen der Union zuwiderlaufen. Das vorliegende Papier besch¨ aftigt sich mit
der Frage, ob diese Zuordnung der Entscheidungsmacht sinnvoll ist. Dazu wird als Vergle-
ichsbasis ein dezentrales System mit Befugnissen auf Seiten der einzelnen L¨ ander, aber mit
M¨ oglichkeit zur fallweisen Delegation auf eine zentrale Instanz herangezogen. Analysiert wird
das Problem im Rahmen eines Cournot Duopols auf einem integrierten Weltmarkt mit heimis-
chem und Drittland–Konsum. Dabei h¨ angt es von der Exportquote und dem Grad der Un-
sicherheit ab, ob Industriepolitik besser von einem zentralen Tr¨ ager durchgef¨ uhrt wird, der
Spillovers internalisiert, oder von den regionalen Regierungen, die ¨ uber bessere Informationen
bez¨ uglich der Kosten des jeweiligen regionalen Unternehmens verf¨ ugen. Um die Auswirkung der
urspr¨ unglichen Verteilung der Entscheidungsmacht auf die tats¨ achliche Zuordnung der Kompe-
tenz in einer bestimmten Branche zu analysieren werden zwei Situationen verglichen: (i) Ein un-
informierter zentraler Tr¨ ager entscheidet ¨ uber die Delegation an die regionalen Regierungen. (ii)
Asymmetrisch informierte regionale Regierungen verhandeln dar¨ uber, ob die Industriepolitik re-
gional oder durch eine zentrale Instanz durchgef¨ uhrt werden soll. Interessanterweise schneidet
bei Verhandlungen mit Seitenzahlungen die Delegationsl¨ osung trotz der Informationsvorteile
der regionalen Regierungen im Durchschnitt besser ab, solange im Rahmen der Verhandlung
kein Informationstransfer erfolgt. Werden jedoch die im Rahmen der Verhandlung empfan-
genen Signale zur Anpassung der eigenen Wahrscheinlichkeitssch¨ atzungen herangezogen, so ist
die Verhandlungsl¨ osung ohne Seitenzahlungen zumindest im Erwartungswert eﬃzienter.
Schlagworte: Delegation; Verhandlungen; Industriepolitik; (De-)Zentralisierung,
Produktdiﬀerentierung
JEL–classiﬁcation: D43, H70, L522 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
1 Introduction
Industrial policy has basically two goals: (i) Imperfect markets do not yield an eﬃcient alloca-
tion. Thus the government has an incentive to correct for these market failures. This objective
will only incidentally lead to a conﬂict between governments in diﬀerent countries or regions.
(ii) As discussed by the theory of strategic trade policy, in imperfect markets governments may
have an incentive to shift rents from foreign ﬁrms to domestic ﬁrms. This aspect clearly leads
to externalities between diﬀerent states. A prisoners dilemma results: All countries would be
better oﬀ if regional governments refrain from a rent shifting policy but there is a unilateral
incentive to deviate from the non–policy option.
In a situation with perfect information it would therefore be preferable to give the decision
power to a central authority that will implement an industrial policy that is only concerned
with the ﬁrst goal. But in reality local governments may have superior information about
local aspects which are not perfectly communicable to a central government.1 Depending on
the relative importance of information advantages and the externality problems mentioned
above either central or decentral policy may be preferable. This kind of trade–oﬀ has been
explicitly analyzed in a local public good context by Laffont/Zantman (2002) and a similar
kind of reasoning can be found in Gilbert/Picard (1996) who analyze the optimal size of
local jurisdictions. In these papers, however, the intensity of the externality is modeled as an
exogenous parameter. We endogenize this variable by discussing the problem in the context of
an integrated Cournot duopoly where the central government has imperfect information about
ﬁrms’ cost. As shown in Morasch (1997 and 2003, ch. 3.1), in this setting it depends on the
amount of third country consumption and the degree of cost uncertainty whether it is optimal
to assign the power to a central authority or to regional governments.2
In an ideal world, the information about consumption patterns and cost uncertainty in a speciﬁc
industry would be determined by an economic analysis and, based on these results, the power
over industrial policy would be optimally assigned. In real world politics, however, choices
are not necessarily made according to economists’ advice but crucially depend on the decision
process and the bargaining power of the parties involved. This aspect will be analyzed in the
present paper by comparing the following two settings:
• Initially the right to perform industrial policy is assigned to regional governments. This
is for example the case if sovereign nations bargain about the delegation of powers to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The delegation to such a central authority will only
result if all countries agree.
1A general discussion how limits to communication may explain decentralization can be found in Poitevin
(2000).
2For an alternative explanation of the relative performance of centralization and decentralization in the
context of industrial policy see Caillaud et. al. (1996). An argument that favors centralization of industrial
policy in an oligopoly context is put forth in Collie (2000).2. Timing and Information Structure 3
• The central government has the decision power over industrial policy but may delegate
this power to the regional authorities. This resembles the situation within most countries
where regional authorities like the Bundeslaender in Germany or the States in the United
States have only limited power. It should also be a realistic description of the situation in
the European Union where the Commission is primarily responsible for industrial policy.
Under perfect information the eﬃcient decision about delegation would not be aﬀected by the
initial assignment of power: The Coase theorem asserts that the parties will achieve an eﬃcient
outcome irrespective of the distribution of bargaining power. This, however, is no longer assured
under the more realistic assumption of asymmetric information. We will deal with this setting
by analyzing the relative performance of delegation under uncertainty versus bargaining under
asymmetric information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the basic structure of the
model, especially with respect to timing and information, will be presented . Section 3 describes
the industrial policy stage of the game for centralization and decentralization. Based on this
information, bargaining among regional governments is analyzed in section 4 and the outcomes
of bargaining and delegation are compared for diﬀerent assumptions about the bargaining game.
Section 5 concludes by discussing the driving forces behind the results obtained.
2 Timing and Information Structure
The problem of deciding about centralization vs. decentralization of industrial policy is analyzed
by comparing two three stage games. These games only diﬀer with respect to the ﬁrst stage:
In the “delegation game” the central authority decides about giving the decision power to the
regional governments while these governments bargain about delegation to a central authority
in the “bargaining game”. In the second stage, depending on the decision in the ﬁrst stage,
either central authority or regional governments impose an industrial policy via production
subsidies or taxes. In the third stage ﬁrms compete in an integrated duopoly market.
The game structure in stages two and three is based on the strategic trade policy model from
Brander/Spencer (1985): The domestic country consists of two regions with one Cournot
ﬁrm in each region. These ﬁrms produce a homogenous good for an integrated market compris-
ing the two regions of the domestic market and a third country which is solely a importer of
the good (if the ﬁrms would only produce for the third country market this would be perfectly
equivalent to the standard formulation in Brander/Spencer, 1985). Industrial policy is
modeled as an output subsidy (or tax if applicable): Either the central government determines
an identical per unit subsidy or tax s for all ﬁrms or each regional government chooses a subsidy
si for the regional ﬁrm. In both cases the actual subsidy to a ﬁrm is ﬁnanced in lump sum
fashion in the region where the ﬁrm is active (in the case of a tax the revenue is distributed
accordingly). This assures that central industrial policy only aﬀects incentives but does not
lead to pecuniary transfers between regions.4 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
For a Cournot model with general demand and cost conditions the following result has been
obtained in Morasch (1997): If the product is only exported to the third country, central
industrial policy will be preferred irrespective of information problems as long as both ﬁrms
have identical costs. However, if the product is not exported to the third country, decentral
policy leads to the same result as central policy for symmetric information and thus dominates
central policy in the case of asymmetric information. The general formulation does not allow
to determine which policy option is superior if part of the production is exported to the third
country or if ﬁrms could have diﬀerent costs. Because explicit results at the policy stage are
necessary to determine the incentives in the ﬁrst stage of each game, we consider a linear
speciﬁcation of the duopoly game that will be described in detail in section 3.
Before explicitly dealing with the delegation and the bargaining stage, respectively, we must
consider how the information structure changes during the game:
• I assume that all players are aware of the structure of the game and initially central and
regional governments have the same (imperfect) information about ﬁrms’ costs (common
priors): For each ﬁrm i high costs, cH
i ,a n dl o wc o s t s ,cL
i , are equally likely.
• Before bargaining starts, each regional government obtains some additional information
about the prospective costs of its ﬁrm. Formally it is assumed that the policy maker in
region i observes a signal σi ∈{ l,m,h} with l indicating a low probability P l
i =1 /4f o r
high costs, m a medium probability P m
i =1 /2, and h a high probability P h
i =3 /4; all
three possible realizations of σi are equally likely. This leads to asymmetric information
in the bargaining stage and an informational disadvantage for the central government.
Note that the signal does not lead to perfect information but just to a more accurate
estimate of the actual costs: The idea is that a regional government will only acquire
further information about its ﬁrm if it actually has to perform the industrial policy.
• As a result of the bargaining game the private information may be, at least partially,
revealed to the other parties. I distinguish two scenarios: (i) Information obtained at
the bargaining stage does not inﬂuence the behavior in the policy stage. Thus signaling
aspects are neglected. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis and makes it pos-
sible to analyze some interesting aspects of bargaining under asymmetric information in
isolation. (ii) More realistically the information, which reﬂects a more accurate estimate
of the actual costs of the regional ﬁrms, may be used by the government of the other
region or a central authority when deciding about the optimal subsidy level. Formally
the common priors are updated by region i or the central government, respectively, by
considering the information Ii(σj) disclosed by the behavior of region j in the bargaining
stage. Note that regional governments obtain perfect information about the costs of their
ﬁrms before they determine industrial policy in stage two of the game. So even if the pri-
vate information at stage one is completely revealed, there is still asymmetric information
in the policy stage.3. Central vs. Decentral Industrial Policy 5
• In the duopoly game at the third stage ﬁrms are assumed to know each others costs. The
reason for this assumption is to abstract from signaling aspects at the policy stage which
have been already discussed in the strategic trade policy literature (see Collie/Hviid,
1993, Qiu, 1994 and Brainard/Martimort, 1996).
In stage one of the game it is assumed that a central authority will delegate the power to
perform the industrial policy if the expected ex ante welfare is maximized by this decision.
Alternatively independent regional governments may bargain over cooperation, i. e. to delegate
the decision to a central institution which tries to maximize joint welfare. The bargaining
strategies are chosen to maximize expected regional welfare where expectations are built based
on the signals received prior to the bargaining stage. I distinguish situations with and without
side payments. Allowing side payments may be more realistic but especially the case with
information linkages becomes quite messy under this assumption. Also it is helpful to abstract
from side payments in a ﬁrst step to get a better understanding of the incentives of regional
governments. Figure 1 illustrates the timing and the information structure of the two games.
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3 Central vs. Decentral Industrial Policy
The incentives in the delegation and bargaining game at stage one depend on the eﬀect of
decentral or central policy on regional and total (domestic) welfare. In this section a relatively
simple linear duopoly model will be analyzed to obtain explicit welfare results. The model
is constructed in a way that allows a parametrization of the share of domestic consumption
and the “degree” of uncertainty, the two parameters which together determine the relative
performance of central and decentral policy.
In a ﬁrst step the game in the output stage shall be described. Two ﬁrms with constant average
costs ci are assumed to compete in Cournot fashion in an integrated homogenous good market
with linear demand p(X)=1− X. The costs which may either be high, cH,o rl o w ,cL,a r e
known to both ﬁrms. For given output based subsidies (s1,s 2) the equilibrium quantities in the




i(s1,s 2)=1 /3(1 − 2ci + cj +2 si − sj). (1)
In the policy stage the governments try to maximize welfare by manipulating the output struc-
ture via appropriate subsidies or taxes. The output of the regional ﬁrm aﬀects the regional
welfare through two channels: The proﬁts of the ﬁrm and the eﬀect on consumer surplus.
For simplicity it will be assumed that the two producing have identical consumption patterns.
Thus the share of total production which is consumed in a given region may be described by
γ = γ1 = γ2 ∈ [0,0.5] — if γ = 0 all output is exported to the third country while γ =0 .5
indicates that everything is consumed within the producing countries (because markets are
integrated, it is irrelevant whether the goods consumed in region i are produced in this region
or in region j).
The welfare Wi of region i may be derived by summing up the proﬁts of the regional ﬁrm and
the consumer surplus in this region:




The regional government i tries to maximize Wi while the central government is concerned
with W = W1 + W2. Inserting the equilibrium quantities in the output stage from equation 1,
welfare may be written as a function of subsidies and costs.
Contrary to the output game, asymmetric information about costs is assumed in the policy
stage. Each regional government only knows the costs of its “own” ﬁrm but not the costs of
the ﬁrm in the other region. The central authority and the government in region i both assign
probability Pj that the costs of the ﬁrm in region j are cH and probability (1−Pj)t h a tt h e ya r e
cL. While perfect information about costs by the regional government and both ﬁrms is surely a
simplifying assumption, the structure of the information asymmetry should be realistic: Firms
interact with each other and the regional government may have close contact to the regional3. Central vs. Decentral Industrial Policy 7
ﬁrm. Thus they will have better information about costs than the central government or the
government of the other region.
How can the equilibrium for the policy game with decentral policy be determined? Because
the regional governments do not have perfect information about the costs of the other ﬁrm,
the standard Nash equilibrium is not a suitable solution concept for the policy game. When
deciding about the optimal subsidy each regional government has to build expectations about
the “type” of ﬁrm which is active in the other region. As a solution concept the Bayes–Nash–
equilibrium applies: Here a game between the diﬀerent types of regional governments — regions
with low cost ﬁrms and regions with high cost ﬁrms — is considered. Let ti ∈ L,H indicate
t h et y p eo ft h er e g i o ni, i. e. whether the ﬁrm producing in this region has low or high costs.
The regional government i which is of type ti tries to ﬁgure out the welfare maximizing subsidy
s
ti







j ) as welfare in region i if the regions are of type ti and tj and choose the cor-
responding subsidies, the reaction function of a regional government of type ti will be obtained










j ) with respect to s
ti
i . This leads to








(1 + 2γ) − (2 + γ)c
ti
i +( 1− γ)[Pj(cH
j − sH











(4 − γ)(2γ +1 )− (2 + γ)(5 − 2γ)c
ti
i
(4 − γ)(5 − 2γ)
+
2(1 − γ)[−(1 − γ)(PicH
i +( 1− Pi)cL
i ]+( 4− γ)(PjcH
j +( 1− Pj)cL
j )]
(4 − γ)(5 − 2γ)
(4)
The subsidy level decreases with higher actual costs c
ti
i and also with higher expected costs
PicH
i +(1−Pi)cL
i . The second eﬀect is due to the strategic interaction between the governments:
If the expected costs in region i increase, the government of the other region will increase its
subsidy and thus the government of region i will use a lower subsidy in equilibrium.
The optimal subsidy level in the case of central policy is determined by maximizing the following





LH(s)+( 1− P1)(1 − P2)W
LL(s)( 5 )
This leads to a subsidy level
s
∗ =
(4γ − 1)[2 − (P1cH
1 + P2cH
2 +( 1− P1)cL




3Note that for substantial cost diﬀerences a high cost ﬁrm will be forced to leave the market if it faces
a low cost competitor. However, the reaction functions are only correct as long as both ﬁrms produce in
equilibrium. In the following analysis parameter values are restricted accordingly to assure positive quantities
in all circumstances.8 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
The central government taxes the ﬁrms if at least 50% of the production is exported. Otherwise
positive subsidies will be used.
Under perfect information (both Pi either 0 or 1) the subsidy s∗ would be lower than the
subsidies in the equilibrium between the regional governments for γ<0.5. Central industrial
policy would then lead to higher welfare because the regional governments do not consider the
negative impact of the subsidies to their regional ﬁrm on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm in the other
region. This is no longer assured under asymmetric information: For γ close to 0.5 the subsidies
for regional policy may be more in accordance with the optimal (perfect information) subsidy
structure because they better reﬂect the actual cost structure. No general statement is possible:
The relative performance of the two policies depends on the exact values of Pi, ci and γ.
To make the economic interpretation easier, a one dimensional measure for the “degree” of cost
uncertainty will be introduced. The importance of asymmetric information depends on the
diﬀerence between cH and cL and on the probabilities for high costs, Pi. It will be assumed that
initially both values of c are equally likely, i. e. the common prior probability for high costs cH
is given by P 0
i =1 /2. Given this the following symmetric speciﬁcation seems to be appropriate:
The two possible realizations may be expressed as cL = E(c) −d and cH = E(c)+d with E(c)
being the expected value of c and d representing a measure for the “degree” of uncertainty. In
the linear model with demand p(X)=1−X the costs could take values between zero and one;
therefore I assume E(c)=1 /2 and thus d can take values in the interval [0,0.5[. A low value
of d indicates that the central government knows the actual costs almost exactly while higher
values represent higher degrees of uncertainty.
Now it is possible to analyze how the share of domestic consumption γ and the degree of
uncertainty d aﬀect the relative performance of central policy CP and decentral policy DP .







































the ex ante welfare diﬀerence (i. e. expected welfare based on the common prior probabilities
P 0
i ) between the two policy options can be written as
EW(CP ) − EW(DP )=
9(2γ − 1)2
16(1 − γ)(5 − 2γ)2 − 2d
2(7 − γ)(2 + γ)2
9(4 − γ)2 . (8)
The ﬁrst term in expression (8) is positive and the second is negative and increasing in d:A
higher degree of uncertainty makes regional policy relatively more attractive. Diﬀerentiating
with respect to γ leads to an expression which is always negative in the relevant range for γ
and d:F o rag i v e nd the regional solution performs better if the share of domestic consumption
is relatively high.
If the ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs it is possible that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm will not have an incentive
to produce in equilibrium. Because considering border solutions would greatly complicate4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 9
the analysis, I will restrict attention to the parameter range where both ﬁrms produce in
equilibrium. Straightforward calculations show that the necessary x∗
i(cH
i ,c L
j ) > 0 will be fulﬁlled
for all values of γ if d<1/8 (for details see Morasch, 1997 or 2003, ch. 3.1) Note that d =1 /8
would denote a cost diﬀerence of more than 50 %. Thus even for substantial cost diﬀerences
both ﬁrms will produce in equilibrium.
4 Comparing Delegation and Bargaining
Now the results of delegation by a central authority will be compared with the outcome of
bargaining by regional governments. The analysis in the preceding section showed whether
centralization or decentralization is optimal from an ex ante perspective, i. e. at the point of
time when no private information has yet been revealed. If the decision is made in this state,
delegation and cooperation would lead to the same (ex ante eﬃcient) result because without
asymmetric information the Coase theorem applies: Eﬃciency is assured independent of the
division of bargaining power. However, this is not the case in our analysis because we assume
that each regional policy maker receives a signal about the prospective costs of its ﬁrm before
bargaining takes place. How does this signal aﬀect the incentives in the bargaining stage? Two
eﬀects may be distinguished: (i) The signal changes the probability that a region assigns to the
diﬀerent realizations of the cost structure. (ii) If the signal is (partially) revealed to the other
region during the bargaining process, the behavior in the policy stage and thus the outcome
for a given cost structure will be changed. We start by considering the ﬁrst aspect in isolation
— the more complex signalling game will be discussed at the end of the section.
4.1 Bargaining incentives and welfare criteria
It is diﬃcult to rationalize the assumption that common priors about costs are not updated
based on the observable behavior of the regional government in the bargaining stage (an at-
tempt is made in Morasch, 2003, 169). However, abstracting form signalling aspects greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis and helps us to deal with some speciﬁc aspects of bargaining with side
payments.
In order to get an understanding how the signal σi changes the bargaining incentives it is
helpful to take a look at the ex post preferability of the two policy options: Which policy is
optimal for a realized cost structure (c1,c 2)? Note that the behavior in the policy stage is
not aﬀected by the signals as long as this information is not revealed to the other region or
the central authority: At the policy stage the regional governments know the actual costs of
their ﬁrms and so the initial probabilities for these costs become irrelevant for their behavior.
Whether central or decentral policy yields higher welfare may than easily be determined by






j ), with the respective welfare
under centralization, W
titj
i (s∗). Figure 2 shows the respective parameter range in (γ,d)–space10 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
Figure 2: Ex ante criterion and ex post optimal policy
































d AB C D E F G
Ex ante efficient decision:
ABCD - central
EFG - decentral
Ex post efficient result:
A - central, G - decentral
BCDEF - depends on realization of costs
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
for each cost structure and in addition the borderline for the ex ante decision criterion, i. e.
the optimal assignment based on common priors.
The central authority must follow the ex ante criterion when deciding about delegation: In areas
ABCD the expected welfare is higher under central policy, while delegation to regional policy
makers is preferable for parameter combinations in EFG. Note that for a substantial degree
of uncertainty, decentral policy is chosen for realistic export shares (e. g. γ =0 .4 indicates an
export share to the third country of 20%). However, if export shares exceed 50% central policy
will always be preferred.
Now let us consider the ex post optimal policy. There are two areas where the delegation
decision of the central government is assured to be correct: In A the central solution is preferred
ex ante (A is left of the thick solid line) and will be optimal ex post for all possible cost structures
— for a relatively low degree of uncertainty and a relatively high export level the externality
problem dominates the information advantages of the regional solution. In area G the decentral
solution is optimal ex ante and ex post: The good is consumed almost completely within the two
producing regions (the externality problem of regional policy is unimportant) and the degree of
uncertainty is substantial. However, in the parameter range between these extremes a decision4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 11
based on ex ante welfare might be suboptimal ex post: If costs of both ﬁrms are actually
identical, decentral policy which is preferable ex ante may be worse than central policy from an
ex post perspective (in EF). On the other hand, if costs diﬀer, the central policy option might
be wrongly chosen (in BCD). The latter result stems from the fact that identical subsidies are
imposed under central policy while the decentral solution yields a subsidy structure with a
higher subsidy to the low cost ﬁrm which enhances eﬃciency because a larger share of total
output is now produced by this ﬁrm.
Note that this eﬀect is only part of the whole story: Incentives also diﬀer between regions
with high cost and low cost ﬁrms. At ﬁrst glance one would expect that the region with a low
cost ﬁrm would prefer the decentral solution because higher subsidies would rise ﬁrm proﬁts.
However, this is not the case:
• For identical costs high cost regions prefer decentralization in both F and G while low
cost regions would favour centralization in area F. How can this be explained? Under
perfect information equilibrium subsidies under decentralization would be higher than
the optimal subsidy imposed by a central government. With imperfect information the
central authority must compromise between an optimal subsidy for high cost and low
cost ﬁrms. For γ close to 0.5 it is in both cases possible that the equilibrium subsidy
under decentralization is closer to the ﬁrst best than the centrally determined subsidy.
However, only in the high cost case the subsidy under centralization exceeds the optimal
perfect information subsidy. This acts as a counterbalance to the eﬀect that decentral
subsidies are to high and thus in the high cost case decentral policy is preferred for a
larger parameter range.
• For diﬀerent costs the high cost region is also more likely to favor decentralization: While
total welfare is maximized by centralization in area AB, regional welfare of the low cost
and the high cost region are higher in ABC and A, respectively. The reason is as follows:
The higher subsidy to the low cost ﬁrm under decentralization leads to lower net proﬁts
(i. e. without subsidy payments) for this ﬁrm. The proﬁts of the high cost ﬁrm are also
reduced but these proﬁts are relatively unimportant for regional welfare. On the other
hand the higher average subsidies under decentralization yield more output and thus
increased consumer surplus. The decentral solution is preferred for a larger parameter
range in the case of the region with a high cost ﬁrm because the proﬁt eﬀect is relatively
unimportant while the higher consumer surplus induced by higher total production is
equally favorable for both regions.
Based on these considerations we are now able to discuss how incentives of regional authorities
are aﬀected by the probabilities (Pi,P j) they assign for high costs of the own ﬁrm and its
competitor, respectively.
• If it is more likely that the ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs, i. e. if Pi(1 − Pj) is higher, decen-
tralization is preferable for a larger parameter range.12 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
• A higher probability of high costs makes the decentral solution relatively more attractive.
A region is thus most likely to prefer central policy for (P l
i,Pl
j) because the probability
of low costs and of identical costs are both high. On the other hand region i prefers the
decentral solution for the largest parameter range in the case of (P h
i ,Pl
i) — here high
costs of the own ﬁrm and diﬀerent costs of the two ﬁrms are both quite likely. Note,
however, that without information transfer these two extremes will not result: A region





j )a n d( P h
i ,Pm
j ) must be considered.
The probability of diﬀerent costs is lower for (P m
i ,Pm
j ) but as will be seen the second eﬀect
dominates: Type h regions are most likely to prefer the decentral solution while type l regions
will favor centralization in the largest parameter range.
The decisions about the strategies in the ﬁrst stage of the bargaining or the delegation game are
based on the impact on expected welfare. Without revelation of information expected welfare
for a region is obtained by simply applying the probabilities for the diﬀerent cost structures
after receiving the signal σi to ex post welfare W
titj
i .W i t hP 0
i as the common prior probability
and P
σi
i as the probability when signal σi has been observed, we obtain the following formula










































































∗)i ne q u a t i o n9b y( s∗)—s∗ does not depend on the ti because the central authority
does not know the costs of the regional ﬁrms when deciding about the optimal subsidy. In the
same manner we obtain the expected welfare of the central authority: For decentralization we
must change EW
σi
i to EW, Wi to W,a n dP
σi
i to P 0








When we observe that bargaining and delegation yield diﬀerent results, we need some criterion
to judge which solution is “better”. The appropriate criterion is “interim eﬃciency” (see
Myerson, 1991, 485 ﬀ.) based on total welfare: A decision over (de-) centralization is said to




2 is maximized. The term “interim eﬃcient”
refers to the fact that expected welfare is considered at the time when the private signals are
already received but before the actual realization of the equilibrium. This concept enables us
to decide whether delegation or bargaining is the preferable mechanism ex ante, i. e. before
any private signals are received: This mechanism should be chosen that leads with a higher
probability to an interim eﬃcient result. Formally the optimal mechanism maximizes the













ll (10)4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 13
By comparing EWσ1,σ2 under central and decentral policy, respectively, we can easily determine
the interim eﬃcient policy for each parameter combination (γ,d). Figure 3 shows the parameter
ranges of the interim eﬃcient policy for the various signal combinations (the formulas for the
limits of each area can be found in Morasch, 2003, 178 f.) and additionally displays the
borderlines for ex post welfare as broken lines. It is interesting to note that for the largest part
of the parameter range — areas A and G — the interim eﬃcient decision does not depend on
the signals obtained. Comparing this with the borderlines for ex post welfare we also observe
that the interim eﬃcient decision could very well be wrong ex post.
Figure 3: Interim eﬃciency without information transfer
Interim efficiency
(without information transfer)
A - central 
B - decentral for hl, lh
C - decentral for hl, lh, hm, mh
D - central for mm, ml, lm, ll
E - central for ml, lm, ll







































Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
In areas B to F the information obtained is important for interim eﬃciency.
• In B decentralization is only preferable for signals lh and hl — while the expected average
cost take only a medium value, the high probability of diﬀerent costs render central
industrial policy unattractive. In C decentralization is also preferable for mh and hm —
here we have higher expected average costs but the probability of diﬀerent costs is lower.
• For signals hh the biggest probability of high costs but costs are also quite likely to be
identical and therefore decentralization starts to be interim eﬃcient in D.14 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
• The ﬁnal two parameter ranges are deﬁned by the borderlines for mm,f o rml and lm,a n d
for ll: In E the decentral solution performs also better for mm, while in F only signals ll
yield centralization as the superior decision — for ll there is a high probability for both
low and identical costs.
4.2 Delegation vs. Bargaining without information transfer
We start with the simplest bargaining setting w h e r ei ti sa s s u m e dt h a tn os i d ep a y m e n t sa r e
possible. Thus the strategy space in the bargaining game is given by ai ∈{ CP, DP } —a
region may either vote for central or decentral policy. The outcome is then determined by
the following voting game: Industrial policy is delegated to a central authority if (a1,a 2)=
(CP, CP ), otherwise the status quo of decentral policy results.4 Because the central solution
will only be chosen if both regions agree there exists a status quo bias, i. e. decentralization is
more likely. In contrast the delegation decision by the central government will not be biased.
However, in this case the decision is based on the common prior probabilities P 0
1 = P 0
2 =1 /2,
while under the bargaining regime the regions could use the additional information about the
likely costs of their ﬁrms. Figure 4 shows which decision results as a function of the signals
obtained.
First note that for most parameter combinations of γ and d both mechanisms yield the same
decision: In area A industrial policy will be performed by the central authority while in area D
decentralization will result. However, if one region obtains a signal σi = h this region will block
centralization in area B. On the other hand, if the signal for both regions is given by σi = l,
both will vote for decentralization in area C.
Before dealing with the question whether delegation or bargaining is better in BC and whether
interim eﬃciency is assured in A or D, I will ﬁrst discuss bargaining with side payments to show
how the results are aﬀected by this complication. If side payments are introduced bargaining
should perform better: While until now one region might decide against welfare maximizing
centralization if expected regional welfare would be reduced, the other country is now able
to get the consent in exchange for an appropriate side payment. While this presumption is
correct for symmetric information, it may be misguiding under imperfect information because
type dependent side payments are not possible. Here the result may be ineﬃcient because
both parties would like to appropriate the gains from an agreement but, because of asymmetric
information, they run the risk of disagreement in order to get a larger share of the pie in the
case of success.
The basic aspects of this problem can be seen most easily by assuming a extreme asymmetry
of bargaining power: Region 1 makes a “take it or leave it oﬀer” of the form: “I will choose
strategy CP if you also play CP a n dg i v em eat r a n s f e rp a y m e n tτ. If you reject this oﬀer I will
choose strategy DP .” Region 2 can either accept this oﬀer, play CP and pay τ which yields
the central solution or it can reject the oﬀer and decentralization results. This distribution of
4For a discussion of diﬀerent voting procedures in the context of project approval see Swank/Visser (2002)4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 15
Figure 4: Delegation vs. bargaining without side payments



































Bargaining without side payments
A – both  central
B  – delegation always central
bargaining decentral for hh, hm, mh, hl, lh
C  – delegation always decentral
bargaining central for ll
D – both  decentral
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
bargaining power is surely unrealistic but the assumption may be defended on two grounds:
(i) With both sided asymmetric information a bargaining mechanism which assures in all cases
an eﬃcient outcome does not exist (see Myerson/Satterthwaite (1983). The basic problem of
bargaining under asymmetric information is thus correctly reﬂected in the present setting. (ii)
Mechanisms with more realistic distribution of bargaining power (e. g. the double auction) are
usually plagued by multiple equilibria.
In general, i. e. even if region 1 did not know which kind of signals region 2 might receive, a
side payment τe which equals the diﬀerence EW
σ1
1 (DP ) − EW
σ1
1 (CP ) would assure eﬃciency
in all circumstances: The other region would accept this oﬀer if and only if EWσ1σ2(CP )
exceeds EWσ1σ2(DP ). However, in this case all gains of an agreement would be appropriated
by region 2. When region 1 wants to determine the transfer τ which maximizes regional welfare




2 (DP ), for all
possible types of region 2. If it wants to assure that the central solution results in any case,
the transfer could be at least as large as the value of CP for a region which received signal h:
τh ≤ EWh
2 (CP ) − EWh
2 (DP ). For region 1 the expected welfare gain (including the transfer




1 (DP ).16 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
This expression is maximized if τh = EWh
2 (CP ) − EWh
2 (DP ) (it is optimal to set the highest
possible transfer payment which assures that region 2 accepts the oﬀer). Alternatively, region
1 could risk that region 2 rejects the oﬀer if it received signal h. In this case the transfer
payment could be substantially higher because it must only be accepted by type m and l
regions which have a stronger preference for central policy. The best strategy is then given
by τm = EWm
2 (CP ) − EWm
2 (DP ). However, because an agreement is now only reached with
probability 2/3 the expected gain is given by 2/3[EW
σ1
1 (CP )+τm − EW
σ1
1 (DP )]. Finally,
a transfer payment could be used which will be accepted only by a region of type l: τm =
EWl
2(CP ) − EWl
2(DP ) . This yields an expected gain 1/3[EW
σ1
1 (CP )+τl − EW
σ1
1 (DP )].
The problem has now been reduced to choosing a transfer payment τ ∈{ τe,τh,τm,τl} which
maximizes the expected welfare of region 1 (the reaction of region 2 has already been taken into
account). To solve this problem, in a ﬁrst step it must be determined which of the strategies τh,
τm and τl yield the highest expected welfare. The resulting transfer payment is the equilibrium
strategy if it exceeds τe;o t h e r w i s eτe is optimal (note that whenever strategy τe is chosen it
will lead to decentralization). Results are displayed in ﬁgure 5 (for a derivation see Morasch,
2003, 4.1.3.2).
Figure 5: Bargaining with side payments
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Bargaining with side payments
A  – central for any signal
B – decentral  for  hh
C – decentral  for  hh, mh
D – decentral  for  hh, mh, hm, lh
E – decentral  for  hh, mh, hm, lh, mm
F – central  for  ml, ll
G – central  for  ll
H – decentral for any signal
Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 17
The solid lines in ﬁgure 5 refer to the borderlines for bargaining without side payments. As
can be seen the bias towards decentralization has increased. The change may become even
clearer by a look at table 1. Here I indicate for each parameter range from B to G which
combinations of signal yield diﬀerent results under bargaining than under delegation (in areas
A and H outcomes are identical for all signals). With bold face letters I point out the diﬀerence
between the situation with and without sidepayments.
Table 1: Bargaining with and without sidepayments — diﬀerences to delegation
Parameter- Bargaining Bargaining
range with side payments without sidepayments
B — hh
C — hh, mh (bargaining
D hh, hm, mh, lh, hl hh, hm, mh, lh decentral)
E hh, hm, mh, lh, hl hh, hm, mh, lh, mm
F ll ll, ml (bargaining
G ll — central)
In a further step we will now apply the criterion of interim eﬃciency and compare the perfor-
mance of the two mechanisms. Because it is straightforward but quite messy to analyze this
question for any signal combination I will only display the main results in ﬁgure 6 (again the
details can be found in Morasch, 2003, 4.1.3.2).
As can be seen bargaining without side payments performs at least as good as delegation for
the largest part of the parameter space and dominates delegation in the relatively large area
D’. Nevertheless there exist parameter combinations (area B’) where delegation is preferred.
Considering bargaining with side payments, we have a reduced area D where bargaining is better
and a greatly enlarged area B where delegation is the dominant strategy. While one would have
expected that sidepayments could improve the situation for bargaining, the attempt to get a
large share of the expected gains from an agreement deteriorates the performance. In a next
step we will discuss whether matters change if information revealed in the bargaining game will
be used at the policy stage.
4.3 Bargaining with information transfer
If information about the signal σi is transferred to the other region or the central government
during the bargaining process, the industrial policy will be changed according to this informa-
tion: Suppose the behavior in the bargaining process indicates that region 2 is either of type
l or m. Given this the politician in region 1 assigns a probability Pj =3 /8 to the outcome
cH and the equilibrium subsidies must be computed based on this probability. Formally the18 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
Figure 6: Interim eﬃciency of bargaining vs. delegation








Interim efficiency of 
Bargaining vs. delegation
A - both efficient [central]
B - delegation dominates bargaining
(interim efficient for all signals)
C - ranking depends on signals
D - bargaining dominates delegation
(efficient for almost all signals)
E-f o r   ll both inefficient [decentral]





























Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
revelation of information will be described as follows: Region i obtains information Ii(σj)a b o u t
the signal of region j. Ii(σj) can take the values {l,lm,m,mh,h} where for example lm in-
dicates the information set {l,m},i .e .t h a tr e g i o nj is either of type l or m. Speciﬁcally m
indicates either a situation with no information transfer or with transfer of information σj = m
or σj ∈ l,h — all three cases lead to a probability P m
j for a high cost ﬁrm in region j.T h e
strategies which result in an equilibrium where information I1(σ2)a n dI2(σ1) has been obtained
are then denoted s
I1(σ2),I2(σ1)
i for decentral policy and sI1(σ2),I2(σ1) for central policy.
With information transfer the analysis becomes much more complicated: When deciding about
its strategy, a region must now consider how this strategy would aﬀect the revelation of infor-
mation about its cost and thus the result at the policy stage. In order to keep the analysis
tractable I do abstract from side payments (which would yield a much larger strategy space).
In determining the equilibrium the concept of “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” will be applied,
which combines the ideas of subgame perfection, Bayesian equilibrium and Bayesian inter-
ference: The behavior in the policy stage must be given by a Bayesian equilibrium which is
consistent with the posterior beliefs of the players which have been updated in accordance with
Bayes’ law (see Fudenberg/Tirole (1991, ch. 8) for a detailed discussion of this equilibrium4. Comparing Delegation and Bargaining 19
concept).
The basic idea of the analysis is straightforward but it is quite messy to check the equilibria
for all possible combinations of signals. I will therefore only discuss one example to give an
understanding of the procedure and then display the result for all signal combinations in an
appropriate ﬁgure. So let us consider the decision problem of a ﬁrm which received signal l.
From the analysis without information revelation we know that a region of type l has relatively
strong preferences for the central solution. Suppose we are in the parameter range where only
ar e g i o no ft y p el would prefer centralization — without information revelation this would be
true in the area C in ﬁgure 3. What happens if such a region indeed chooses action CP in
equilibrium?
• With probability 1/3 the other region is also of type l and the industrial policy will be
performed by a central authority. In the policy stage the central authority knows that
both regions are of type l and will thus impose a subsidy (or tax) sl,l.
• With probability 2/3 the other region received signal m or h and thus votes for DP which
in turn leads to decentralization. In the policy stage the other region will be aware of the
fact that region 1 observed signal l while region 1 knows that region 2 is either of type m














2 ). Note that the preferred solution of region 1 results only with prob-
ability 1/3. In the other cases decentralization is the outcome. However, playing CP has the
additional eﬀect that the signal obtained by region 1 is revealed to the other region and the
central authority. This revelation of information makes central policy more eﬃcient and is also
in the interest of region 1 if decentral policy results because region 2 will reduce its subsidies if
the probability of a low cost ﬁrm in the other region rises. As shown in ﬁgure 7 similar forces
are at work in the other cases and thus bargaining is more likely to yield centralization than
in the case without information transfer (for details see Morasch, 2003, 4.1.4). Note that
area B is divided in two subareas B1 and B2. This is necessary for comparing bargaining and
delegation, because delegation yields centralization in B1 and decentralization in B2.
Delegation dominated bargaining without information transfer for some parameter combina-
tions. We will now deal with the question whether bargaining performs better if the possibility
of information transfer is considered. Because the information on the policy stage may no diﬀer
between the bargaining and the delegation game, the criterion of interim eﬃciency is no longer
suﬃcient to determine which mechanism is preferable: (i) Even if bargaining and delegation
yield the same decision, the information structure may be diﬀerent in the policy stage and
thus welfare will not be the same. (ii) On the other hand if information about the signals is
revealed in the bargaining game, the borderlines for interim eﬃciency will be diﬀerent for the
two mechanisms.20 Deciding about (De-)centralization of Industrial Policy
Figure 7: Bargaining with information transfer
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without information transfer
(= borderline under delegation)







bargaining with information transfer
A - central for any signal
B - decentral for hh, hm, mh, hl oder lh
C - central for ll
D - decentral for any signal
AB C D






















Source: Mathematica plot based on own calculations
Taking this into consideration, a quite messy analysis for any combinations of signals must be
performed (again consult Morasch, 2003, 4.1.4 for details). Based on this analysis we obtain
the result displayed in table 2:
Table 2: Bargaining with information transfer vs. delegation
Signals Parameter range
B1 B2 C
ll (+) + [+ ∗ /−]
lm,ml +∗ [+ ∗ /−]( + )
lh,hl +( + ) ( + )
mm (−)∗− ∗ (−)∗
mh,hm ++ + ∗
hh − (+) (+)
The three parameter ranges refer to these in ﬁgure 7: In areas A and D no information is
revealed because all types choose centralization or decentralization, respectively; therefore only5. Conclusion 21
areas B1,B 2 and C are relevant. For these parameter ranges the results for all combination of
signals are displayed. Note that a + indicates that bargaining performs better while − stands
for an advantage of delegation. If a result is also interim eﬃcient this is marked by a ∗.B r a c k e t s
are used if a mechanism is only better due to information transfer and square brackets are set
if the relative performance changes within the parameter range. As can be seen, in expectation
bargaining performs better than delegation for the whole parameter range and is therefore ex
ante preferable:
• In B1 bargaining yields a superior decision in six cases while in this respect delegation
only has a lead for hh. Each mechanism has an advantage due to information transfer in
one case. Note that interim eﬃciency is only obtained for three signal combinations.
• In B2 again bargaining yields the correct choice in more cases (3:1) and in addition
is superior because of the information transfer in another three cases. Delegation is
only preferable for mm and in lm and ml the relative performance changes within the
parameter range.
• Finally in area C the decision under bargaining is correct (and interim eﬃcient) for signals
mh and hm. In ﬁve other cases the information transfer yields higher welfare for this
mechanism. Delegation is only better for mm and for ll the relative performance changes
sign in the relevant parameter range.
5C o n c l u s i o n
As shown in the literature it often matters whether policy is performed by regional govern-
ments or by a central authority. However, an optimal assignment of the decision power is not
necessarily assured in practice: A central government may lack information while regional gov-
ernments which bargain about cooperation may forego eﬃcient agreements for selﬁsh reasons.
In the present analysis two procedures, delegation by central government and bargaining by
independent regional authorities, have been compared in an industrial policy model. For the
case without information transfer it has been shown that bargaining is biased towards decen-
tralization: If no agreement is reached, decentralization results. In spite of superior informed
regional government, delegation by the central government may then perform better for a sub-
stantial parameter range. Surprisingly, bargaining performs even worse if side payments are
introduced: The parties risk disagreement in a situation where all types of regions would prefer
centralization in order to appropriate larger gains if the other region has high preferences for
central policy. However, if information revealed in the bargaining stage may be used by the
other region or the central authority in the policy stage, the situation changes: Here bargaining
is preferred in expectation to delegation, i. e., given the probability of the signals, expected
welfare his higher under bargaining. Note, however, that this result was obtained in a set-
ting without side payments — it may be possible that bargaining would perform worse if side
payments are introduced (this speciﬁcation has not been tractable in the model).References
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